No. 13

<The spatio-temporal total horizon of the world and its invariant form>[[1]](#footnote-1)

How do I carry out the transcendental epoché, and [how do I] produce the evident reduction to transcendental subjectivity?

1) I gain as first transcendental subjectivity my own, the [transcendental subjectivity] of my transcendental ego with its conscious life (cogito), in which the world being for me is a transcendental phenomenon, as universal *cogitatum*. The world in which I live, which I presuppose in what kind of occupations ever, in experiences, fantasies, thoughts, etc. as surrounding life-world, the world to which all my scientific convictions do relate as well, is always pre-given in all such occupations, that is, accepted by me, partly currently conscious for me, partly and together with this consciousness, or rather, implicitly presupposed within this consciousness, accepted in advance. I am thus led back from the world towards me, [to] my current and potential conscious life, to my being with my abilities, my associations, my consciousness’ performances of any kind, and lasting acquisitions of the consciousness. The world of which I respectively speak, which I respectively consider, is something accepted of my acceptance (of the current or hidden accepting) and of a sense being a sense within me, having sprung from my own active or passive performances.

**Reduction**: I consequently make the universe of my subjective peculiarities, performances, modes of consciousness, in which “the” world is given to me, and continues to shape itself for me in its being sense through continuing, ever new performances, and will in future be pre-given within the changed [being-sense] an **exclusive theme**, and eventually myself, while keeping the world parenthesized. I am as a worldly man pre-given myself; I also reduce my worldly being to my meanings, my acceptances, in which I am already pre-given to me, as often as I reflect upon me.

**[119]**If I start with me, and if I take myself purely as someone meant of my self-experiences and other self-meanings, also of the old ones, the acquired and going on being accepted, then I soon see that **the whole world belongs to my pre-givenness**. The transcendental “residuum” of my human existence makes my transcendental ego as the [ego]apperceiving itself as human, and [the ego] apperceiving the world, in which I, this human, live, and from which I, this human, have experiential knowledge, knowing, etc. in the natural way.[[2]](#footnote-2)

The transcendental ego that I gain am I myself, reduced to that being, in which my human ego and this ego’s world, in which thereby human consciousness life, human cognition, action, etc. <are>, constitutes itself as world accepted by me (by me, the transcendental [ego], and again by me, the human ego).

But of course here is the question:

2) How can I make my transcendental ego a scientific theme, a theme of knowledge? And initially: How far can I gain direct experience of it, initially perception – transcendental-egological experience and knowledge?

This seems to be rather simple, according to the scheme *ego-cogito-cogitata*. I simply perform transcendental reflection – like when I perceive a thing – on this I-perceive, whereby I purely give acceptance to the thing as something perceived of this perceiving.

3) I enter the **eidetic attitude**, and now I have on the one hand **ont<ic> apriori** as related to my ego as such as apriori correlate, but within anonymous veiledness of its constituting life; on the other hand I have the **noetic apriori**, and thereby the apriori of the constituting egoical subjectivity. And both in one: possible world as conscious to me, accepted by me in all possibilities (which are variants of the de facto world and of my de facto ego), that is, essentially accepted as intentional unity of the *a priori* corresponding modes of consciousness of the possible ego correlative to the possible world.

**[120]** 4) All that prior to the questions of genesis, and a s presupposition for such questions. I need to have the apriori of the static correlation in order to be able to ask for the “genesis of this apriori”, as genesis of the concrete subjectivity, and its correlative “world” – with the “ego, this man” as secularization of the concrete transcendental subjectivity, and of all its transcendentally constitutive performances of consciousness.

*Ad 2-4*: Horizonedness in which the world is given as **being** in a **being-sense**, that is, in a certainty of being, and yet at each time-modal point within a horizon of possibilities of being thus, open which of them is the actual one. I now have in some measure a “predelineation” of the world under the title of the known despite the horizonedness, that attacks this as well. But all predelineation being thus changeable still remains within a continual and continually anticipated **formal structure**. If I go through the possibilities that a “totally unknown” object, predelineated in my horizon external of the special predelineation as empty possibility, but still as open possibility, can take over, the same remain within a constantly known, unquestioned form of the spatio-temporal real, that at any rate is founded on a physical corporeality, etc.

In general the given world is **spatiotemporal**, and each totally unknown object is also known in that it is at each temporal point of its duration within the endless space, the form of the simultaneous objects. Each possibility that this unknown object holds is only conceivable as a possible actuality and then as something possibly perceptually self-given with a horizon of disjunctive possibilities, its own-essential [possibilities], that would become perceptible through ongoing synthetic perception, and of its external possibilities, with regard to a horizon of <objects> that become known through perception, and then likewise come to own-essential acquaintedness in ongoing perception, but *in infinitum* with regard to the spatial: to each [object] belongs an experienceable (ongoing experienceable) shape and all shapes of all co-existing things <are> ordered into the endless space that always remains within the experience as open horizonlike given [space], given in possible **[121]** experience which fundamentally never stops, never excluding any possibilities of coexisting still unknown realities. Likewise with the temporality of succession as open horizon of the experienceable future and the experienceable past of objects, the single duration of which, and duration taken in a multiple way remains itself a stretch of an endless horizon of still unknown past and future objects.

**The spatio-temporal form is not simply the horizon of the unknown things, but [it is] also form of the already known**. The de facto shape of any object now experienced for me, and having become known in shape occurs among the possible shapes as such, that a totally unknown object can have as spatial object. Conversely: If I take the known object as if it were still completely unknown like it formerly was for me, thus the de facto shape that it now actually shows is one of the possibilities that beforehand have been open; and if I vary my de facto object, freely fantasying it as different, I go through the system of possibilities that it has in common with the [system] of each other object and of each temporal locus. All possibilities, the free possibilities through fantasying otherwise of what is certain to me with an actuality-predelineation, as well as the bound, but open possibilities within the unknown, are still bound in a certain way. Initially, as we take it here in a limiting way, understood as possibilities of something worldly and world regarding the spatio-temporally formal. For every possible single real thing: The system of all possibilities has a form that is invariant, that thus can never be varied itself, that necessarily is everywhere the same. This expresses itself initially in such a way that each possibility of a real thing has a contentually identical (an own essential) [form] among the possibilities of any other optional real thing. **The world is “homogenous” in spatio-temporal regard**, that is, for all corresponding “things” (realities and their “nature”), but also <for the> real pluralities belonging to it, that are as such “configured” within the known fact like in all possibility, i.e., that have a plural-unitary shape that as well has its system of possible shapes. If we now take the given world in its totality, that is in its infinity, in which it is formally predelineated, then as being for me (and then being for everyone) it respectively has **[122]** a special, determining predelineation, but also as a total one, so that in a certain sense it is only respectively and in its omnitemporality an endless configuration, infinitely undetermined-unknown within the horizonedness; but in the way that in the field of totally unknown things each total world possibility is within a system of total world possibilities, which is identical with the system of free possibilities at each temporal locus and concretely with regard to each duration, in which – whatever changes and unchanges may take place <therein> - <a> unitary spatiotemporal shaping (also of the qualifying one left open here) may persevere. In the way [of this shaping] the system of the endless world’s possibilities also comprehends all possibilities of the single things and configurations of things, also of those emerging through possible division into pieces and putting together the pieces as a conspicuous kind of change. **The spatio-temporality is the endless total form** as the fundamentally only horizonlike to be imagined form of all possible “finite” forms, i.e., of all possible forms of single realities, and single configurations of pluralities, which can in the widest sense co-exist within the world, that is only actual within the horizonedness of the actuality’s predelineation through open ranges of possibilities. Open ranges are systems of solid form, and thus always predelinetaed along with all the other indeterminacy, while everything already known, determined, having become known by way of experience in its free possibilities must accord with the open possibilities of an optional unknown, thus it must have the same form in its system as the system of any unknown. A systematic extension of the form systems of finiteness performs itself in the way, in the infinitely mobile way of the “conceiving” of the world’s infinity from any single real thing, or from an endless configuration (whether determined through experience, or considered as pure possibility); each system becomes an enlarged system, and as that it becomes a system of an enlarged finite configuration. The invariance of the form of each conceivable finite configuration, and of its soon conceivable extension becomes an invariance of the enlarged <configuration>, and of its system, and so on *in infinitum*. But exactly this *in infinitum* constitutes the infinity’s form **[123]** and [the form] of its way of encompassing all finite forms.

If we now regard the given world as a merely possible world, if we arbitrarily fantasy otherwise the fact of this world (with its invariant “transcendental-aesthetic” form of shaping), and [if we] go through all free possibilities, or rather design in a freely fantasying way, then we gain the **eidos** “**world**” as the invariant essence, that belongs to each possible world as from the de facto exactly by free variation to be constructed possible, imaginable <world> - in the system that thereby emerges as system of eidetic possibilities. Now it is a matter of course – according to our presentation – that the spatio-temporal form as well, the configuration form of the world, and of each conceivable [world], has to belong to the eidos “world”. The form **of the** world is form of each conceivable [world] – I say it again, of course according to our presentation, but otherwise [it is] not a matter of course, and therefore explicitly to be stated. We do not gain the form of the de facto world through its eidetic variation, although in detail an eidetic variation has been used in a certain way. Maybe we can also describe the method of the exhibition of the world’s de facto form thus: We say the world was a spatiotemporally formed world, and [we] say it initially from the flowing experiential present, in which from a content of the actually experienced “of the world” exactly a horizonlike world as such has predelineated [itself] for us as being, is anticipated as being, and that in the mode of an open endless spatio-temporality. To intend to make this horizon intuitional means: to become aware that from what is actually self-given, and thereby [from what is] fixed in a material, contentual way we have many possibilities, <many> open ranges of possibilities that are to be made intuitional, that is, initially in the way of unexperienced co-present, whereby **co-existing** is certain in an undetermined way, but the indeterminacy simply means determinability in an open range of possibilities, from which one, [though it is] undetermined which one, is actual. But likewise with regard to the past and future being in acceptance as well, beyond that one that in a certain way is determined through recollection or a certain anticipation. The open possibilities, always kept in open ranges, and only thus to be made intuitional as “possible experience”, **[124]** now have their open range style, as a form like we have pointed out. Since each past is a past present, but also each co-present, and each future [is a] modification of present, it is thus clear: Whatever former or future [present], whatever represented and possible present we might single out –the style of the horizonednesss and the form of the world’s present is always the same, and we always have a totally unknown horizon with its system of possibilities, and the possibilities are always formed in the same way. What is already determined within the conceived present could be an undetermined possibility from a former one, that is, only predelineated as being in the mode of the open range. And there we said: Obviously the possibilities of an open range as such are identical with the possibilities that would arise as free ones through freely fantasying as otherwise of that which is de facto determined. But with all that we are still on the ground of the actual world, namely of [the world] pregiven to us by way of our de facto experience. We see that the **world can never be otherwise determined for us than with an open range of undetermined possibilities**, and that it has everywhere in its being, in its infinity of the spatiotemporal being an invariant form for simultaneous and successive being, for spatial shape and persisting being, under the title “spatio-temporality” that within the shaping of space persists at essential possibilities of the changing and unchanging of shape. The invariance does not concern the [spatio-temporality] that <stands out> in eidetic world variation, but it concerns the always anticipated, horizonlike spatio-temporality, namely that it is not an empty succession, and “at the same time”[[3]](#footnote-3), but a rule of shaping and changing of shape, a universally and necessarily binding style of form, encompassing all finite possibilities, and in progression always remaining preserved *in infinitum*. We can also say: spatio-temporality designates a homogeneity of shape for the spatio-temporal world that can be expressed by the intuitive variation of each actually possible world present being the same for any other [world present]: a same possibility in all variations here and there.

Correlatively we have for the world itself a formal homogeneity: and not only for the world as being horizonlike anticipated, in the mode of its intuition. Since respectively one of the system’s possibilities, [though it is] undetermined which one, is posited as certain, as necessarily being. **[125]** The determined realities and shapes are in each de facto present of the world itself different, but <they are> shapes of a homogeneous space as form of simultaneity and form of all motions and deformations (in which from a unitary shape temporally emerges a unitary shape).The form is the encompassing <un>changeable universal shape, encompassing all special shapes and their variations. Like a finite shape remains still a unitary shape in the change of its special shapes (as multiple of its members), and thus in each extended shape of which it is a part itself, thus it is continuingly accepted, namely in the progression of the extension “*in infinitum*”. The infinity of realities, regarded as spatio-temporal shapes alone, according to the shape is an endless shape. Space is the continuity of shape that goes through all shaping within the finite, and [it] is at the same time a horizon form of all possibilities of shaping that are bound by an essential form as undetermined possibilities.

Appendix VIII

To explicate systematically the constitution of the given world– that is, to explicate systematically the horizon structure of the same. The intermingling of the horizons. Important things concerning the doctrine of the horizons[[4]](#footnote-4)

The world as pre-given within the constancy of the “external” experience – the world as the apriori for each “possible experience”, for each determined cognizance of something being in a respective being thus emerging within the experience, for each determined judging, for each knowledge springing or sprung from experience, and the re-verification of the knowledge. What does this mean: “The world, the being of the world is pre-given, is the fundamental apriori”, since it is doubtlessly accepted as well that everything I know of the being world, or of the being of the world, I know from experience?

“To know of the world’s being” – this implies an ambiguity. What does “to know” designate here? Obviously [it does] not [mean]: to currently judge the being of the world. A not current cognizance does suffice that for its part has been gained formerly in current judgments or [in] current cognizance in mere experiences, without stating anything about it then. It is evident that **[126]** I would not know anything of the world’s being without current experiences. What kind of experiences? Spoken more clearly: without current experience of things, of worldly objects, realities. We call “world” the **all** of mundane objects, of the actually being [objects]. Thus no experience, pure and simple,, no “mere” experience straight forwardly – as that of an object – is an experience or knowledge of the world, nor [is it] obviously a synthetic experience of multiple, and how many objects ever. And yet – if I shall have some knowledge of the world **through** it <and> initially experiencing knowledge of the world’s being in an original way, I have to experience any objects. Single experience precedes world experience, “knowledge” of a single thing [precedes] the “knowledge” of one and “the” universe of details. Thereby a multiplicity of experienced objects that I take hold of in a collecting way is not by any means the same as the world. How do I know of a world that it exists, and [that it exists] as **the** world that is one single world? How do I know that what I respectively experience, the single and the multiple is something single and multiple **out of** the universe “world”? How do I know in detail “in advance”, “*a priori*” of a plus? And of what kind is this plus, that I gain ground for speaking of world experience and apriori world knowledge?[[5]](#footnote-5)

a) It is paradox and still doubtless that there is no experience in the first simple sense of an experience of a physical thing, which, when it first grasps this thing, cognizes it, does not already “know” more of it than what is cognized by doing so. Each experience whatever it experiences in a proper sense, whatever it catches sight of as **itself**, has *eo ipso*, has necessarily a knowledge and a co-knowledge regarding exactly this thing, namely of what is peculiar to it, of what it has not caught sight of yet. This pre-knowledge is contentually undetermined or determined in an incomplete way, but never completely empty; and if it was not co-accepted, the experience in general would not be experience of one and this thing. “Each experience has its experiential horizon”, each has its **core of actual and determined cognizance**, has its content of immediately self-given determinacies, but beyond this core of determined being thus, and within the given “properly being there itself” it has a **horizon**. Obviously this implies: Each experience refers to the possibility – and from the ego [it refers] to a facultative possibility – to gradually explicate not only the thing, the self-given on first viewing according to the thereby properly self-given, but to gain further and ever new determinations of the same in an experiencing way. Each experience has to be spread out into a continuity and explicative combination of single experiences **[127]**, synthetically united as one single experience, an open endless [experience] of the same. The actually already experienced may be enough for my respective end, but then I “simply break off” with the “It is enough”. But I can convince myself that no determination is the last one, that the actually experienced still has, endlessly, a horizon of possible experience of the same. And this [experience] is in its indeterminacy in advance co-accepted as an open range of possibilities, predelineating as a course of closer determination, which only within actual experience decides for the determinate possibility by actualizing it, in contrast to other indeterminate possibilities.

b) We have not reached the end by this. Each experienced thing, each actually experienced group of things (actually experienced within the just designated first horizonedness) has an open-endless external horizon of fellow objects: that is, [it has] a horizon of the second grade, related to <the> horizon of the first grade, implying it. Thus an anticipation of possible experience in open infinity [and] of complicated structure belongs to each experience. But by pursuing this, by going further into it, one arrives at a complicated horizon structure with an intermingling of horizons in each single physical experience, and initially perception, whereby a reference of intrinsically first to intrinsically later horizons (intentional modification) goes on; and all gradually implicated possibilities are experiential possibilities of **the same** thing. Each perception as anticipated co-present has its horizon of what is perceivable of the same real thing. But it also has a horizon of the open endless past of the same real thing and likewise future – with corresponding more exact explications ever leading further.

The actual world in its possibilities is always anticipated “*a priori*”, and anticipated in such a way that it can be made intuitional as a possibility within the open range of its possibilities in consequent unanimity. Problem of the world view. And construction of the essential form – the ontological form - in free varying of the possibilities. From each experiential real thing and its own horizonedness (in its possibilities) the pre-given world has to be constructed in its world form – as universal spatio-temporal nature, as universe of the mutual externality within the basic forms “space” <and> “temporality”. Core-structure “physical nature” – co-existent in it, localized and temporalized, the psychic belonging to the organic bodies. – Psychophysical nature.

This is the ground for the acceptance of being: the apriori implied in all explicit acceptance of being (that of the experience, and that following the experience) is prior to the construction that the ontologist performs constantly existent in a flowingly changeable mode, because – this has to be **[128]** stated explicitly – experience, and thereby together with this also any other explicit positing of being proceeds in constancy: Whatever is currently accepted within the waking life, a core of current experience and thereby the horizon corresponding to it – in its changeability - is the basis of all presentness. It is in such a way present that within the course of constant experience constantly goes on a “predelineation” (original induction, inductive horizon) of the already experienced towards the “predelineated” by it in the modes of the determinacy-indeterminacy. And this predelineation of “what will come now”, within the vital experience of the presight, exactly this [predelineation] has always a wider horizon within the reference to further predelineations coming later as implicit potentialities. – Infinity of the implication, that is, an intentional structure of the total horizon as horizon.

This whole consideration is just a beginning. We would now have to go into how not only actual and possible details can become a theme within the horizon together with the potentiality of the possible nexus of experience, but also [how] the **all** of the details enclosed within the horizon can become a theme as an experience of a higher level, and for each single thing again the **allness** of its properties encompassed in anticipation, etc. Thus universe as universe – in the direction of answering the leading question placed in front.

On the other hand, the horizon is related to the being posited in certainty of being, but each being thereby is existent exactly with an anticipated horizon of multiple certainties of being, that are concordant towards a unity of certainty in a synthetic-unanimous way. Horizon thus expresses unanimity. – We did not mention the modalizations and their relation to the inner and external horizonedness, whereby the total horizon as allness of the single being that is co-accepted from the single thing is not modalizable. The world’s certainty of being in the way it is founded in modalizable single certainties is an apodictic basis for all modalizations, etc.

Furthermore: If the structure of the unanimous world acceptance as horizon acceptance is clarified at a core respectively accepted in certainty, and [if it is] therefore related to the all-encompassing multiplicity of subjective appearances remaining accepted and modalizing acceptance, then the subjectivity emerges as basic theme of a new experience and certainty of being – the totality of the subjective in its own horizonedness. Within the horizon here are all relative unanimities, but also discordancies within the subjectivity as the one in which acceptance and “being” happen.

But now this subjectivity: I, the cognizing, the experiencing, experience other subjects, but not only as worldly objects, but as **[129]** fellow subjects. But now we face the single subjective surroundings in which, since the other subjects belong to them as objects, also their surroundings are implied – but in such a way that each subject has the foreign surroundings on its own accord, in its “apprehension”, in certainty of being. Furthermore, the world is for me a world through the others, through experiences, through knowledge, etc., that I take over from them, that communicate with me by way of expression, that they possibly currently communicate with me on purpose, while at the same time the others in every respect – also what they communicate to me, express – are themselves existent for me only by way of my experience, - but, no, as worldly being others they are existent for me only through the others, the actual and possible [others], etc. There is a togetherness and intermingling of all subjective horizons, including the generative communalization, its communalization of the horizons in all forms of community.

How to proceed? World – to explicate world, accepted by me, as the one accepted by me, as <the one> that is not only accepted by me, but constantly is apodictically certain in universality, and contentually in such a way, that I am within it, and other subjects together with me, and [that] we are within it as those experiencing it, etc. <and> that we are within it as living in it, as generatively connected and communalized, [that] we do not only have a world consciousness therein as such, but affect each other within the togetherness of the conscious-of, <and> that the world by tradition has a sense for everyone, that the world is always world for us due to normality and anomaly, etc.

To explicate systematically the horizon structure is to explicate the intentionality in which the world is constituted.

1. Possibly September 1931. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Transcendental reduction of myself equivalent to the [reduction] of the world. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Inverted commas added by the translator. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. At the end of May 1934 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. I presuppose of course for this question that experience in fact does give me a single real thing. – But is this actually the case according to the way that a single real thing is experienced? [↑](#footnote-ref-5)